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An industry typically experiences initial mass entry and later shakeout of 
producers over its life cycle. It can be explained as a competitive equilibrium 
outcome driven by dynamic interactions between technology progress and demand 
diffusion. After a new product is introduced, technology improves with cumulative 
production and S-shaped diffusion is generated as the product penetrates a positively 
skewed income distribution. Eventually fewer new adopters are available and the net 
number of producers starts to decline. It is shown that faster technological learning, 
higher mean income or larger market size contributes to faster demand diffusion and 
earlier industry shakeout. Comparative studies on the US and UK television 
industries and evidence from ten other US industries support the theoretical findings. 
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1 Introduction
1.1 Questions on Industry Life Cycle
As a new industry evolves from birth to maturity it is typically observed that price
falls, output rises, and the net number of ﬁrms initially rises and later falls (Gort and
Klepper 1982, Klepper and Graddy 1990). In particular, the nonmonotonic time path
of ﬁrm numbers, termed as “shakeout”, has been the focus of many recent studies of
industry economics. The big question is why there is a shakeout and when it occurs.
To answer that question, most existing theories emphasize supply-side factors,
particularly the inter-ﬁrm diﬀerences in technology. It is shown that shakeout can
be triggered by “emergence of dominant design” (Utterback and Suárez 1993), “race
of innovation” (Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994, Wang 2005), or “scale economy of
R&D” (Klepper 1996, Klepper and Simons 2000). Some other explanations appeal
to uncertainties in new product markets. For example, “uncertain proﬁt” (Horvath,
2Schivardi and Woywode 2001) or “uncertain market size” (Rob 1991, Zeira 1987,
1999) can also result in a mass entry and later shakeout.
Though these theories have contributed to a much improved understanding of
industry shakeout, some important issues are still underexplored. In particular, the
impacts of demand characteristics on industry life cycle dynamics are largely over-
looked.1 As a result, it remains diﬃcult to explain certain empirical facts. For
example, Figure 1 plots the ﬁrm numbers in the US and UK television industries.2
The television was commercially introduced into the US and the UK at the same time
after the WWII, and the two markets were segmented for the following two decades
because of their diﬀerent technical standard.3 This natural experiment shows that
the patterns of industry evolution were very similar across countries, but the mass
entry and shakeout of TV producers were uniformly lagged behind in the UK.
What can explain this cross-country diﬀerence of timing of shakeout? The existing
theories may apply to some extent, but not quite enough. On one hand, industry
studies (e.g. Arnold 1985, LaFrance 1985, Klepper and Simons 1996) document
numerous technological changes in the TV industry that may have a major cumulative
eﬀect on inter-ﬁrm heterogeneity. However, they do not directly explain the timing
of shakeout, let alone the cross-country diﬀerence. On the other hand, the market
uncertainty could not have caused the shakeout repeatedly since at least the UK
producers could easily learn from the US market experience. Moreover, the TV
shakeouts, especially the Black & White TV shakeouts, had little to do with foreign
competition since the import and export were very insigniﬁcant at that time.4
1An exception is Hopenhyan (1993), where some demand issues are brieﬂy discussed.
2Data source: Simons (2002), Television Factbook (various issues).
3The UK adopted the 405-line screen standard in 1943, but other nations proceeded to adopt
standard with higher resolutions. The UK standard remain anomalous through 1964, when some
UK broadcasts began using the internationally common PAL 625-line color standard. Hence through
1964 and even later, UK market was isolated from the foreign competition. See Levy (1981).
4In 1950s, US and UK were the two largest TV producers in the world, but imports and exports






























Figure 2: Household Adoption of TV: US vs. UK
1.2 New Hypothesis
One potential problem is that the aforementioned theories may have overlooked the
importance of demand-side issues. A new product, over its life cycle, typically experi-
ences strong demand growth at the early stage but the growth eventually diminishes
as the market reaches maturity. As a result, the demand characteristics can have
inﬂuential, sometimes critical, eﬀects on the evolution of industry. Without taking
that into account, the analyses on industry life cycle would be incomplete.
In this paper, we consider explicitly the roles that demand plays in driving the
industry life cycle, and reveal how country-speciﬁc demand factors, the income dis-
tribution and market size in particular, shape this process. When a new product
is introduced, high-income consumers tend to adopt it ﬁrst. The technology then
improves with cumulative production (Learning by Doing) and S-shaped diﬀusion is
reach 10% of domestic production until 1965 in US, and until 1970 in UK. Data sources: Television
Factbook (US), Monthly Digest of Statistics (UK).
4generated as the product penetrates a positively skewed income distribution (Trickle
Down Eﬀect and Income Growth Eﬀect). Eventually fewer new adopters are available
and the number of ﬁrms starts to decline. It is shown that faster technological learn-
ing, higher mean income or larger market size contributes to faster demand diﬀusion
and earlier industry shakeout. This new theory therefore oﬀers additional demand-
side explanations for the varying pattern of industry evolution across products and
countries. For example, it suggests it was the lower per capita income and smaller
market size in the UK that led to a slower diﬀusion of TV (Figure 2)5 and hence a
lagged industry shakeout.
1.3 Relation to Other Research
The main purpose of this paper is to complement existing theories of industry life
cycle by exploring the previously largely unexplored demand side. In doing that, it
also links the studies of industry economics with research in several separate ﬁelds.
For example, in the marketing literature, the diﬀusion of new products has been
studied for the purpose of demand forecast and monopoly pricing (Bass 1969, Kalish
1983, Horsky 1990). In the growth literature, the learning by doing is one of the
most important sources of technology progress (Arrow 1962, Lucas 1993, Jovanovic
& Rousseau 2002, Matsuyama 2003). In the international trade literature, the most
celebrated “product cycle theory” claims that the demand for new consumer goods is
initially greatest in high-income countries, and diﬀu s et ol o w e r - i n c o m ec o u n t r i e sl a t e r
on (Vernon 1966, Stokey 1991 and Grossman & Helpman 1991). In the technology
adoption literature, it has been found that per capita GDP is one of the key variable
that explains the diﬀusion rate of new technology across nations (Comin & Hobijn
2004). Those studies have so far been unconnected with the study of industry evolu-
tion. This paper is a ﬁrst step to ﬁll this gap, and show that the typical pattern of
industrial evolution is closely related and consistent with the ﬁndings in those ﬁelds.
5Data source: Television Factbook (various issues), Bowden & Oﬀer (1994).
51.4 Road Map
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 studies the supply structure of a compet-
itive industry and reveals the comovement between the ﬁrm numbers and the relative
industry GDP. Section 3 endogenizes the logistic diﬀusion curves by modeling explic-
itly consumers’ heterogeneity of income and preference. Section 4 puts together the
supply and demand, and introduces the law of motion for technology and income.
Section 5 characterizes the industry dynamics and discusses the time paths of key
industry variables. Section 6 extends the model to durable goods. Section 7 esti-
mates our model using data of the US and UK TV industries as well as ten other US
industries. Section 8 contains concluding remarks.
2 The Supply Structure
In this section, we model the supply structure of a competitive industry and reveal
some important relationship among key industry variables, namely the comovement
between the ﬁr mn u m b e r sa n dt h er e l a t i v ei n d u s t r yG D P .
2.1 The Model
Assume a competitive industry produces one homogenous product. There are M po-
tential producers that diﬀer in their production eﬃciency θ ∈ (0,∞) for participating
in this industry. The eﬃciency θ is distributed with cdf function S(θ).E a c hp e r i o d ,
a ﬁrm that actively produces in this industry incurs an opportunity cost C,w h i c h
corresponds to the foregone earnings of human capital needed to run the ﬁrm.6 For
6Our model of ﬁrm is a simpliﬁed treatment as in Lucas (1978), but can be interpreted broadly.
For example, the parameter θ may include any ﬁrm-speciﬁc factors that aﬀect production eﬃciency,
e.g. management ability, physical location, industry experience and etc. Also, C captures the
foregone earnings of ﬁrm human capital that are compensated from the production residual, e.g.
the management group and R&D team. For simplicity, C is assumed identical across ﬁrms. However,
6at y p i c a lﬁrm, x and y respectively denote the input and output. The production
function is assumed to be y = θAxα where A is the technology and 0 <α<1 is the
“span of control” parameter.7 Let P denote the price of output, w the price of input.
We also assume that ﬁrms can enter and exit freely.8
An individual ﬁrm, indexed by its eﬃciency θ, has zero measure. Each period,
ﬁrm θ takes the market price P as given to maximize the proﬁt:
πθ =m a x
yθ,xθ
Py θ − wxθ − Cs . t . y θ = θAx
α
θ



























T h ef r e ee n t r ya n de x i tc o n d i t i o ne n s u r e st h a tt h em a r g i n a lﬁrm ˜ θ, the lowest-
eﬃciency player allowed in the industry, breaks even. The market price is then
determined as
π˜ θ =0= ⇒ P =
C1−αwα
(1 − α)1−α(α)αA˜ θ
(1)





















πθ =[ ( θ/˜ θ)
1
1−α − 1]C. (3)


















this assumption is not at all essential. Allowing C to be heterogenous, e.g. C ∈ [C,C] does not
change the analysis. A detailed proof is available from the author.
7Assuming 0 <α<1 implies that ﬁrms face diseconomy of scale in the short run when technology
and market condition are given. See Lucas (1978).
8This is also a simplifying assumption but not essential. Our main conclusions remain unchanged
if the entry incurs a sunk cost. The proof is available from the author.





At equilibrium, the market supply equals the market demand. Equation 1 and 4














If C, the foregone earning of ﬁrm human capital, grows with the mean income
μ of the economy (e.g. C = φμ) and the parameters α and S(θ) are time-invariant,
there exists an important time-series relationship between the ﬁrm numbers N and
the relative industry GDP, PY/μ.
Proposition 1 In a competitive market, the number of ﬁrms is positively related with
the relative industry GDP, i.e. ∂N/∂(PY/μ) > 0.
Proof. It follows Equation 5 and 6.
2.2 Examples and Remarks
There should be no surprise to ﬁnd out a comovement between the number of ﬁrms
N and the relative industry GDP, PY/μ. In fact, the proﬁto ft h em a r g i n a lﬁrm
increases with PY (the total industry GDP) and the opportunity cost of participation
is determined by μ (the mean income of the economy). It follows that the ratio PY/μ
k e e p st r a c kw i t ht h ev i a b l en u m b e ro fﬁrms.9
This result is fairly robust for a homogeneous-product industry under free entry
equilibrium. Supporting empirical evidence can be found from many industries in-
cluding TV (see Figure 3, 4 and section 7.3).10 To derive this result, the production
9Under some addtional assumptions, such as θ follows a Pareto distribution or a degenerate
distribution, we can further show that the number of ﬁrms is proportional to the relative industry
GDP, i.e. N ∝ PY/μ. However, those assumptions are not necessary for the purpose of this paper.
10Data source: Gort and Klepper (1982).
8Figure 3: Firm Numbers and Relative Industry GDP: Evidence I
function that we assumed is not crucial but will help make our following dynamic
analysis more tractable. However, assuming α and S(θ) to be time-invariant is nec-
essary.11 In fact, by not allowing α and S(θ) t oc h a n g e ,w ec o n s t r a i nt h er o l et h a t
the inter-ﬁrm heterogeneity can play in the industry dynamics, which is a major dis-
tinction between our theory and the existing supply-side literature. In Appendix A,
we relax the assumptions to consider more supply-side eﬀects, and show the essence
of our analysis still carry over.
3 The Demand Structure
Now let us turn to the demand side. To explain the industry evolution, it is very
crucial to understand the dynamics of new product demand. In this section, we
propose a novel analysis on that.
11Throughout the paper, we do not require θ to be ﬁxed over time for each individual ﬁrm, but
rather the overall distribution S(θ) is time-invariant. See section 5.3. for more discussions.
9Figure 4: Firm Numbers and Relative Industry GDP: Evidence II
3.1 Questions on Traditional Wisdom
It has long been a challenge to explain the demand diﬀusion of new products. In the
economics and marketing literature, the most popular theory relies on the behavioral
assumption of social contagion, i.e. consumers imitate early adopters. This expla-
nation has been formalized by introducing the logistic model and its variants since
1950s (Griliches 1957, Mansﬁeld 1961 and Bass 1969).




= vFt =⇒ Ft =
1
[1 + ( 1
F0 − 1)e−vt]
(7)
where Ft i st h ef r a c t i o no fc o n s u m e r sw h oh a v ea d o p t e dt h ep r o d u c ta tt i m et,a n dv
is a constant contagion parameter.
Though the logistic model has traditionally ﬁt data very well, some important
issues remain unclear. In particular, assuming homogenous adopters and exogenous
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Figure 5: Per Capita GDP and TV Adoption in 104 Countries, 1980
across countries (regions), consumer groups and products. To compromise those
issues, many following studies added rather ad hoc assumptions to the contagion
framework, e.g. assuming the diﬀusion parameters to be function of traits like region,
consumer type and product.
However, the key question is — how much does the contagion eﬀect really matter?
Figure 5 plots the TV adoption rate verse per capita GDP for 104 countries in 1980.12
At that time, TV was no longer a new product so that there really leaves little room
for contagious spread of information to explain the diﬀusion.13 However, it is evident
that adoption is so strongly related with income across countries.
12Data source: UN Common Database.
13Sometimes, the social contagion model is interpreted more broadly to include network eﬀects of
consumption. However, as Bowden & Oﬀer (1994) shows, the US enjoyed a uniformly faster adoption
than the UK in consumer appliances including TV, Cloth Washer, Cloth Dryer, Dishwasher, Electric
Blanket, Freezer, Radio, Refrigerator, Vacuum Cleaner and etc. Many of them certainly have litter,
if any, network eﬀects of consumption among consumers.
113.2 Alternative Approach
This paper is hence motivated to take a diﬀerent approach. Without assuming social
contagion framework, we derive the logistic diﬀusion curve as a demand function
generated from heterogeneity of consumers.14 As a result, it becomes more clear how
the diﬀusion process is shaped by economic forces like price and income.
The model is as follows. Assume a new nondurable product sells for price P in
the market.15 An individual consumer adopts it only if her disposable income Id on
that product allows her to do so, i.e.
y = {
1 if Id > P,
0 if Id <P .
Consumers are heterogenous in their disposable income Id on this new product.
This heterogeneity comes from their diﬀerent income and preference. We assume for
an individual consumer t h ed i s p o s a b l ei n c o m eId is the product of her total income
I (I ≥ 0) and propensity of spending c (1 ≥ c ≥ 0), i.e. Id = cI. I and c are
independently distributed over the population. A direct implication of this assump-
tion is that new products diﬀuse faster in higher-income groups.16Figure 6 presents
supporting evidence from the Black & White TV in the US and the UK.17
Notice that the disposable income Id is generally not directly observable, but it
can be nonetheless inferred from the observables. In particular, the way we model it
s u g g e s t st h a tw i t hag i v e nd i s t r i b u t i o no fp r e f e r e n c ec, a higher mean (inequality) of
total income I implies a higher mean (inequality) of disposable income Id.
14This is not a totally new idea (e.g. Cramer (1969) and Bonus (1973) derive normal diﬀusion
from individual consumers’ Quasi-Engel curves), but the way this paper derives logistic diﬀusion
and connects it to demand models is new.
15In chapter 6 and 7 we will see that introducing durability does not change the analysis.
16Denote H(c) the cdf function of c. For a given income group the fraction of adopter is Pr(Id >
P | I)=1− H(P/I) and it rises with I.
17Data source: US from Bogart (1972), UK from Emmett (1956).
12Figure 6: TV Penetration Rates by Income Class: US and UK
3.3 An Explicit Formulation: Log-logistic Distribution
To take our analysis a step further, we have to model the disposable income more
explicitly. By the way that it is constructed, we know that Id is distributed over the
positive domain [0,∞), so its distribution tends to be positively skewed. The possible
candidates for this group of distribution are far from unique, so we choose to pick a
reasonable one.
In the following discussion, we introduce the log-logistic distribution as our speciﬁc
example.18 T h er e a s o nf o ru st op i c kt h el o g - l o g i s t i cd i s t r i b u t i o ni sn o to n l yb e c a u s e
it serves as an easily tractable example, but also because it connects our study to the
typically observed logistic diﬀu s i o nc u r v e sa sw ew i l ls h o wn e x t .
The log-logistic distribution is deﬁned as the distribution of a variate whose loga-
rithm is logistically distributed. Assuming that the disposable income Id follows the
18The application of log-logistic distribution in economics has a long history, traced back to the
study of Lomax (1954) on business failure rates, and to Fisk (1961) on the size distribution of income.
Figure 7 gives an example of using the Fisk (log-logistic) distribution to ﬁt US family income in
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Figure 7: US Family Income Distribution 1970
















where Γ denotes the gamma function Γ(μ) ≡
R ∞
0 iμ−1 exp(−i)di.






where g = g(Id).
Recall E(Id)=E(c)μ. We can now derive the adoption rate F to be a function




where η =( Γ(1 + g)Γ(1 − g)/E(c))1/g.
143.4 Endogenous Diﬀusion vs. Exogenous Diﬀusion
The appealing feature of introducing log-logistic distribution is to endogenize the
logistic diﬀusion curves. To see that, let us assume that the price declines at a
constant rate Pt = P0e−ρt, and mean income grows at a constant rate μt = μ0ezt.




Comparing Equation 9 with Equation 7, we realize that our formula is equivalent
to the logistic model under very reasonable assumptions. In particular, the diﬀusion
parameters traditionally treated exogenous now have clear economic meanings — the
contagion parameter v is determined by the growth rates of price and income, and
the initial condition F0 is the fraction of adopters who can aﬀord the new product at
t h ei n i t i a lp r i c ea n dm e a ni n c o m e :
v =( ρ + z)/g; F0 =
1
1+η[P0/μ0]1/g.
This result is also empirically plausible. Sultan et al. (1990) analyzed the para-
meter estimates of 213 published application of the logistic model and its extension.
They report the average value of v =0 .38. Jeuland (1993, 1994) ﬁnds that the value
of v is rarely greater than 0.5 and rarely less than 0.3. Assigning reasonable values of
Gini coeﬃcient and growth rates of income and price, our model can easily generate
the value of v within that range.
4 The Industry Equilibrium
4.1 The Momentary Equilibrium
Combining the supply and demand analyses, we are now ready to derive the industry
equilibrium. At a point of time, the industry equilibrium implies (1) individual ﬁrms
15take the market price as given and maximize proﬁt; (2) individual consumers take
the market price as given and maximize utility; (3) industry price, output and ﬁrm

























Notice that m denotes the total number of potential consumers. It is reasonable
to assume that the normalized ratio M/m is a constant, and does not vary with the
population size.
This is a system of four equations with four unknowns. The solution suggests
that the equilibrium values of P, Y, ˜ θ and N are endogenously determined by four
important parameters: technology A,m e a ni n c o m eμ, foregone earning C and input
price w. With reasonable assumptions on the law of motion for those parameters, we
will then be able to characterize the time path of industrial evolution.
4.2 Law of Motion Equations
4.2.1 Learning-by-Doing Technology Progress
Technology progress is commonly observed over the industry life cycle. Many theo-
retical and empirical studies (e.g. Arrow 1962, Boston Consulting Group 1972) have
identiﬁed learning by doing as one of the most important sources. Therefore, we
assume that the technology A is determined by the cumulative industry output:
16At = A0(Qt)
γ (14)
in which Qt =
R t
0 Y (s)ds + Q0 and γ is the learning rate.
Equation 14 implies that only aggregate cumulative output matters to every pro-
ducer’s productivity. In fact, a ﬁrm’s own contribution to Q may matter more,
especially at high frequencies ( Irwin & Klenow 1994, Thompson & Thornto 2001).
However, at lower frequencies, the distinction between own and outside experience
should fade given a wide range of channels by which information diﬀusion can occur.19
4.2.2 Income Growth and Its Eﬀects
As an economywide variable, it is reasonable to assume the mean income μ grows at
an exogenous rate z. The foregone earning C of ﬁrm human capital, as we discussed
in section 2.1, may grow with the mean income μ:
μt = μ0e
zt with μ0 > 0,z > 0;
Ct = φμt with φ>0.
The law of motion for the input price w is a little complicated. Since we assume
there is only one input in our model, w is actually a composite price index for both
labor and non-labor inputs. Though the price of labor inputs may grow with the
mean income, the price of non-labor inputs such as capital and materials does not.
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that d(w/μ)/dμ < 0. A simple formulation is
wt = σμ
ψ
t with σ>0,ψ < 1.
4.3 The Dynamic Equilibrium
Given the law of motion equations, it becomes clear that there are two driving forces
of industry dynamics — technological learning (due to cumulative production) and
19Lieberman (1987) lists many of these channels: employees may be hired away; products can be
reverse-engineered; patents can be invented around or infringed and etc.
17Figure 8: Product Diﬀuses as Technology and Income Change
income growth. As the initial adoption of a new product starts, these two forces
interact to generate further technology progress and demand diﬀusion, and keep this
process going (See Figure 8).
































γ where Qt =
Z t
0
Y (s)ds + Q0; (19)
18μt = μ0e
zt (20)
from which we are ready to characterize the time path of industry evolution.
5 The Industry Evolution
5.1 Industry Dynamics: Characterization
With the assumption of learning by doing, the market demand equation 17 implies a
ﬁrst-order diﬀerential equation




where the relatively price Pt/μt is a function of (Qt,t), and the function is determined























where At = A0(Qt)
γ; μt = μ0e
zt.
Characterizing the solution to the diﬀerential equation, we have following ﬁndings:
Theorem 1 (Unique Solution): There exists a unique dynamic path Q(t) of
˙ Qt = f(Qt,t) for t ≥ 0 which satisﬁes Q(0) = Q0.
Proof. Given f is continuously diﬀerentiable, it satisﬁes the Lipschitz condition:
| f(x,t) − f(y,t) |≤ L | x − y | where L =s u p| ∂f/∂Q | .
Theorem 1 then follows Theorem 5 of p23 in Birkhoﬀ & Rota (1968).
19Theorem 2 (Unique Shakeout): Given a log-logistic distribution of disposable
income, there exists a unique shakeout.

















A ss h o w ni nP r o p o s i t i o n1 ,∂Nt/∂(PtYt
μt ) > 0. Furthermore, Equation 22 implies
that Pt/μt decreases with At and μt.S i n c eAt = A0(Qt)γ and μt = μ0ezt are strictly









Hence, the unique shakeout occurs at (Pt/μt)∗ =[
g
η(1−g)]g and the corresponding
adoption rate is F∗ =1− g.I fP0/μ0 > [
g
η(1−g)]g,t h eﬁrm numbers initially rise and
later fall. If P0/μ0 < [
g
η(1−g)]g,t h eﬁrm numbers decline from the beginning.
Theorem 3 (Comparison Theorem): Anything else being equal, the relative
price Pt/μt falls more quickly, the diﬀusion Ft proceeds faster and the timing of
shakeout t∗ comes earlier if (1) technology is better (higher Q0, higher A0 or higher
γ); (2) mean income is higher (higher μ0 or higher z); (3) market size is larger
(higher m); (4) input price is lower (lower φ,l o w e rσ or lower ψ).
Proof. Let us take γ as an example, and the other proofs are similar. The proof
takes the following three steps:
(1) Equation 21 and 22 deﬁne ˙ Qt = f(Qt,t),w h e r ef satisﬁes the Lipschitz
condition. Since ∂f/∂γ > 0 for any given (Qt,t),ah i g h e rγ leads to a higher Qt
(hence higher At)a ta n yt i m et. This result follows Theorem 8 and Corollary 2 of
p25-26 in Birkhoﬀ & Rota (1968).
20(2) With ∂At/∂γ > 0 at any time t, Equation 22 and 17 imply that a higher γ


























η +[ Pt/μt]−1/g} =0 .
S i n c ew eh a v ep r o v e di nT h e o r e m2t h a t
∂(Pt/μt)






















Hence a higher γ leads to an earlier shakeout.
5.2 Industry Dynamics: An Intuitive Illustration
More intuitively, the industry dynamics can be illustrated as follows. First, Equation
17 implies that there is a downward-sloping demand curve on (P/μ,F).N o t i c et h a t




and the inverse demand function is convex (∂2(P/μ)/∂F 2 > 0)f o rF ∈ (0,
1+g
2 ),b u t
concave (∂2(P/μ)/∂F 2 < 0)f o rF ∈ (
1+g
2 ,1).
Second, Equation 15 and 16 suggest that the supply curve is upward sloping on
(P/μ,F), and shifts to the right if the technology A or mean income μ is higher. The


















21Figure 9: Industry Life Cycle: An Illustration
Plotting the demand and supply curves on the graph of (P/μ,F) for a given tech-
nology A a n dm e a ni n c o m eμ, we can then pin down the solution for the momentary
equilibrium with Figure 9.
For the dynamic analysis, we need notice that there is an important property of








which decreases with F and achieves unit at F∗ =1− g. It suggests something
crucial for the time path of relative industry GDP, PF/μ, as well as the number of
ﬁrm N: if an industry starts from an initial condition that F0 < 1 − g, the supply
curve will keep shifting to the right as the technology and mean income improve and
the industry achieves the unique shakeout at F∗ =1− g.20
20It is clear that our core results hold in more generality. The only key assumption we need is
the decreasing price elasticity of demand. Introducing log-logistic distribution enables us to justify
22With Figure 9, we can clearly identify the two driving forces of industrial evolution
and discuss their eﬀects as follows.
• In the presence of technology progress (γ>0) but no income growth (z =0 ) ,
the supply curve shifts to the right due to cumulative production. As the result,
the industry relative price P/μ as well as the absolute price P keeps falling,
and the product penetrates into lower-income groups. Eventually, the demand
growth is overtaken by the technology progress so less ﬁrms are needed. Hence
we observe the aggregate demand turns inelastic and the shakeout starts.
• I nt h ep r e s e n c eo fi n c o m eg r o w t h(z>0) but no technology progress (γ =0 ) ,
the supply curve shifts to the right due to income growth. Though the absolute
price P may not fall (e.g. ∂P/∂t > 0 if 0 ≤ ψ<1), the relative price P/μ
keeps falling and induces more adoption.21 Eventually, as the market demand
turns inelastic to the relative price, the growth of industry proﬁt is outstripped
by the growth of foregone earnings of human capital so the shakeout comes in.
• In the presence of both technology progress (γ>0) and income growth (z>0),
t h es u p p l yc u r v es h i f t st ot h er i g h td u et ob o t hc u m u l a t i v ep r o d u c t i o na n d
income growth, and the two driving forces interact to result in demand diﬀusion
and industry shakeout.
With Figure 9, it is also easy to understand the comparative dynamics proved in
Theorem 3: if the technology is better (higher Q0, higher A0 or higher γ), the mean
this assumption with typically observed diﬀusion curves and uncover the links with the underlying
income distribution.
21In the literature of international economics, it is termed as the “Balassa-Samuelson Eﬀect” that
a non-tradable good typically has a higher price in a richer country due to the higher foregone
earning for producing it. However, in spite of the higher price, the consumers in a richer country
typically consume more of the good given their higher income. It is consistent with our model that
it is the relative price P/μ rather than the absolute price P that drives the demand diﬀusion.
23income is higher (higher μ0 or higher z), the market size is larger (higher m)o rt h e
i n p u tp r i c e si sl o w e r( l o w e rφ,l o w e rσ or lower ψ), it contributes to the cumulative
production and/or income growth so the supply curve shifts faster to the right. As
the result, the industry achieves faster demand diﬀusion and earlier shakeout.
The above discussion provides a meaningful explanation for the variation of in-
dustrial evolution across countries. For the US and the UK, the income inequality
and consumer preference are similar, so their threshold adoption level for shakeout
F∗ =1− g should be close. Therefore, the US, being relatively richer and larger,
tends to enjoy faster demand diﬀusion and earlier industry shakeout.
5.3 Industry Life Cycle: Further Implications
Our model also delivers rich implications on other aspects of the industry life cycle.
As suggested, ﬁrms are diﬀerent in size and proﬁt due to their heterogenous eﬃ-
ciency (i.e. ∂y∗
θ/∂θ > 0 and ∂πθ/∂θ > 0). Assume each individual ﬁrm’s eﬃciency θt
is ﬁxed over time. Since the minimum ability requirement ˜ θt falls before the shakeout
and rises afterwards, we then observe that high-eﬃciency ﬁrms enter the industry
earlier and survive longer. It is usually termed as “ﬁrst mover advantage” though it
indeed is ﬁrms who have advantage that move ﬁrst.
This result can be easily generalized. In fact, our analysis does not require a ﬁxed
θt for each individual ﬁrm over time. As a simple example, we may assume
lnθt =l nθ + εt (25)
where θ is an individual ﬁrm’s ﬁxed eﬃciency, and εt are i.i.d. random shocks.
It implies that the overall distribution of θt is time-invariant, but individual ﬁrms
have idiosyncratic shocks.22 As a result, we may observe both entry and exit before
and after the shakeout, and the net number of ﬁrms evolves as our model describes.
22For example, if lnθ and εt are normally distributed, θt then has a time-invariant log-normal
distribution.
24Moreover, since ﬁrm eﬃciency is time persistent, we also observe early entrants tend to
be larger and have higher survival rate. This result is consistent with well-established
ﬁndings of industry studies on ﬁrm age and size eﬀects (Evans 1987a, 1987b, Dunne,
Roberts and Samuelson 1988, 1989, Audretsch 1991). Simons (2002) shows it is
particularly true for the US and UK TV industries.
As technology improves, each individual ﬁrm’s output tends to grow. Given the
assumption 25, our model suggests that surviving ﬁrms tend to have the same propor-


















































1−α(εt − εt−1) are i.i.d. random shocks, we tend to observe that
surviving ﬁrms grow at the same positive rate.
Furthermore, as the industry evolves, the market concentration ratio displays the
“U” shape over time, and the industry proﬁtability goes to the reverse direction. To
see that, denote λq to be the market share for the top q ﬁrms that survive the period



















23Alternatively, if we assume lnθt = λlnθt−1 + εt with 0 <λ<1 and εt i.i.d. normally distrib-
uted, θt also follows a time-invariant log-normal distribution but the growth of a surviving ﬁrm is
decreasing in size. All the other results remain unchanged. It is consistent with studies of Evans
and of Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson.















6 Extension to Durable Goods
So far our theoretical work is built on consumer nondurable goods. However, the
analysis can be readily extended to durables. This extension will not only be of its
own theoretical interest, but also help our empirical work.
It is the issue of durability that complicates the analysis of durable goods. For
a durable good, consumers actually pay rental price for the service from the stock
of the good, and the producers are paid the output price to supply the increment of
stock to meet the demand. Therefore, some modiﬁcations are needed for our original
model.24
First, we have to derive the rental price from the output price. At equilibrium,






where r i st h em a r k e ti n t e r e s tr a t ea n dδ is the depreciation rate. It implies that the












Second, the output Yt for durable goods is made of two parts. One is the demand
growth of the stock m(Ft − Ft−1). The other is the replacement demand δmFt−1.
24The model is now set in discrete time so that it can be directly brought to the empirical study
in the next section.
26Therefore, the total output is
Yt = m(Ft − Ft−1 + δFt−1). (28)
For a durable good, the rest equilibrium conditions stay the same as the non-
durable goods. Notice that if δ =1 , the full depreciation, we actually get back to the
case of nondurable goods.
Assuming learning-by-doing technology progress and constant income growth, we
can then characterize the industry dynamics. As we go through the empirical study
in the next section, we will see that with some minor reinterpretation most our
theoretical analyses for nondurable goods remain unchanged for durable goods, and
are supported by the data.
7 Model Estimation
In this section we mainly use the data of TV, a durable good, to estimate our model.
Given the complex dynamic system and limited data, it is generally diﬃcult to di-
rectly test against competing theories with standard statistical tests. However, the
estimation results show that our model ﬁts the data as well as, if not better than,
alternative theories.
7.1 Data
The origin of TV industry can be traced back to 1930s, when innovation and ﬁrst
production of B&W TV started in the US and the UK. However, WWII resulted
in the curtailment of TV production in both countries and it was not until after
the war that the TV market got oﬀ the ground. In our study, we focus on the TV
industry evolution from late 1940s to late 1960s, namely the B&W TV age. During
that period, the US and the UK were the two major countries that pioneered the TV
adoption and production, and these two markets were segmented.
27To estimate our model, yearly data of 7 variables for the B&W TV industry in
both the US and the UK are collected. The dataset includes the number of TV
producers, TV output, value of TV output, household numbers, TV adoption rate,
nominal GDP per capita and CPI. For the UK, we also collect the data of TV licence
fee.
Two additional data are also used to extend our empirical work. One is the Gort
& Klepper (1982) dataset, which covers the ﬁrm numbers, price and output for many
US industries from their beginning years until 1970. The other is a panel dataset of
B&W TV adoption across 49 US continental states in the 1950s and 1960s.
A detailed description of our datasets is provided in Appendix B.
7.2 Estimation Strategy
Our model requires estimating a four-equation system for market structure, pricing,
adoption and output. For a consumer nondurable goods, it is the system of equations
15 - 20 that we should estimate. For a consumer durable good like TV, it is the system
that we discussed in section 6. Since both of them involve a system of equations, we
then have to deal with the issue of simultaneity. There are two approaches that we
may consider as follows.
• OLS (Ordinary Least Squares): If the heterogeneity of ﬁr m si sn e g l i g i b l e ,O L S
yields consistent parameter estimates. Indeed under the assumption of identical



















where κ and β are constants, εt and  t are random errors. For a durable good,
the price equation 29 stays the same, and the adoption equation 30 still holds
28if the consumer expects the price to decline at an approximately constant rate
which typically ﬁts well with data. Notice that the system of equations 29
and 30 is recursive since each of the endogenous variables can be determined
sequentially and the errors from each equation are independent of each other.
In a system of this sort, the OLS is the appropriate estimation procedure.
• 2SLS (Two-Stage Least Squares): If the heterogeneity of ﬁrms is not negligible,
we have to confront the problem of simultaneity. Notice that in the case of
nondurable goods, equation 29 actually is a reduced-form linear equation for
price. Hence it can be estimated with OLS in the ﬁrst-stage regression and
the ﬁtted values of the dependent variable ln(Pt/μt) can then be used in the
second-stage regression for the adoption equation 30. However, for durable
goods, equation 29 may be less robust since the lagged adoption rate is also
involved.
In the following sections, we report the estimation results of OLS since the 2SLS
results are very similar.
7.3 Market Structure Estimation
Proposition 1 predicts comovement of the ﬁrm numbers and the relative industry
GDP, i.e. ∂N/∂(PY/μ) > 0. To check it with data, we apply the following regression
to the US and UK B&W TV industries and ten other US industries in the Gort &
Klepper (1982) dataset:
lnNt = a + bln(PY/μ)t + νt
where νt is assumed to be a Gaussian white noise process.25
The regression results are reported in the following Table 1:
25The results are robust to alternative assumptions such as the error has time trend or serial
correlation.
29Table 1: Testing Proposition 1
Product Data Range b
(S.E.)
b ≤ 0 adj.R
2 Corr
( N, PY/μ )
Black & White TV (US) 1947-1963 0.31
(0.12)
R 0.28 0.61
Black & White TV (UK) 1949-1967 0.57
(0.11)
R 0.57 0.72





















Tapes, Recording 1958-1970 0.73
(0.08)
R 0.90 0.92






R: Reject at 5% signiﬁcance level
For all 12 products included in the test, we reject the null hypothesis b ≤ 0 at
5% signiﬁcance level, which suggests that Proposition 1 works well for this sample
group of products. Given the evidence presented in Figure 3 and 4, the results are not
surprising at all. As we mentioned before, it is still possible to ﬁnd counterexamples
but that does not necessarily invalidate our analysis (See Appendix A).
7.4 Price Estimation
We estimate here three alternative models on price. Model (P-2), derived from our
theory (Equation 29), estimates the relative price using real per capita income and
30Figure 10: TV Relative Price Estimation: US and UK
cumulative industry output. The parameters to be estimated are changing rate of
relative input price α(ψ − 1) and technological learning rate γ. For comparison, we
also estimate two additional models. In Model (P-1), the relative price is estimated
with a time trend only, which provides the average annual price change. In Model
(P-3), the cumulative output of the US production is included in the estimation of
the UK TV relative price so we can estimate how much the UK producers may have
beneﬁted from the technology spillover from the US.
ln(Pt/μt)=κ + ωt+ εt; (P-1)




)=κ + α(ψ − 1)ln(μuk,t) − γ ln(Quk,t−1 + hQus,t−1)+εt (P-3)
where μ is real per capita GDP in 1953 dollar (pound) and Q is cumulative output.
The results are in Table 2. All the parameter estimates have the expected signs
and most are statistically signiﬁcant.26 The estimation of Model (P-1) shows the
26Notice that the regressions may involve nonstationary time series so that the t test becomes
31US enjoyed a much faster annual declining rate of the relative TV price than the
UK. By estimating the learning by doing equation, Model (P-2) suggests that the US
advantage was due to a faster declining rate of input price in addition to the larger
cumulative output. Figure 10 provides the data ﬁtting using Model (P-2).
Since the TV industry was developed earlier and faster in the US, we may wonder
whether and how much the UK producers could have learned from the US experience.
M o d e l( P - 3 )t e s t st h i sh y p o t h e s i sb yi n c luding the US cumulative output into UK
relative price equation. The regression is conducted using nonlinear least squares.
Comparing the estimation results with Model (P-2), we ﬁnd that introducing the US
experience does not improve ﬁtting the UK price data, and the parameter estimates
are almost unchanged.27 Moreover, the magnitude of h,t h ec o e ﬃcient of US experi-
ence, is very small if it exists at all. This ﬁnding is consistent with our assumption
that these two markets were technologically segmented during that period.


































* Statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level.
less meaningful. However, OLS still consistently estimates the parameters as long as the regression
equations are correctly speciﬁed. Cointegration tests are conducted for each model speciﬁcation,
but the results are not conclusive because of the small sample size.
27It is not surprising that the estimates of Model (P-3) are not statistically signiﬁcant given the
limited data we use to estimate a nonlinear model.
327.5 Adoption Estimation
We estimate here four models for the B&W TV adoption. First, if the diﬀusion is a




− 1) = β + wt+  t (A-1)
where β =l n (1
F0 − 1), w = −v.
For a consumer durable good like TV, if the decision makers predict a constant
price declining rate, i.e. Et(
Pt+1








where β =l nη + 1
g ln(1 − 1−δ
1+rρ).
To check the robustness of our theory, we also conduct a panel estimation using




− 1) = β +
1
g
ln(Pt/μi,t)+ui +  t (A-3)
where Fi,t is the TV adoption rate of state i at time t, μi,t is the per capita income
of state i at time t,a n dui is the ﬁxed eﬀect of state i.
One thing special about the UK TV market is that the UK government imposes
a TV licence fee, which is in fact a tax on TV ownership. As our theory predicts, it
would further delay the TV adoption and shakeout. To include the TV licence fee














where R =[ 1− 1−δ
1+rρ] is the TV rental rate, Lt is the TV licence fee at year t.
The estimation results are in Table 3. In term of R2 value, we ﬁnd the endogenous
diﬀusion models (A-2) and (A-4) ﬁt data better than Model (A-1). Of course, this
result by itself is not suﬃcient to reject the contagion model, but at least suggests
our theory, built on consumer heterogeneity, provides a very competitive explanation.
33Figure 11: TV Adoption Estimation: US and UK
Model (A-3) reports the panel-data estimates using the ﬁxed-eﬀect model (random-
eﬀect model is rejected by the Hausman speciﬁcation test). Impressively, the results
are very close to what we estimate using Model (A-2). It hence gives us more conﬁ-
dence on our theory. See Figure 11 for the data ﬁtting.





























* Statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level.
34Figure 12: TV Output Estimation: US and UK
7.6 Output Estimation
Having estimated the adoption rates of B&W TV, the output estimation becomes
straightforward. The demand function takes the following simple form as Equation
28:
Yt = mt(Ft − Ft−1 + δFt−1)+υt
where mt is the number of households at time t, δ is the annual depreciation rate. It
implies that the annual output consists of two parts: the ﬁrst purchase from the new
adopters and the replacement purchase from the existing adopters.











* Statistically signiﬁcant at 5% level.
35Given the data of Yt, mt and Ft, the only parameter to estimate is the depreciation
rate δ. Though a constant δ seems to be a relatively strong assumption, the estimation
results in Table 4 suggest that it does explain the data pretty well. See Figure 12 for
the data ﬁtting.
7.7 Demand Factors, Diﬀusion and Shakeout
The regression results show that our model ﬁts the time paths of industry variables
very well. We are now ready to explore the speciﬁc roles that demand factors played
in shaping the TV industry evolution in the US and the UK.
T h ef a c t sa r ef o rt h eU Ki nt h a tp e r i o d ,t h ep e rc a p i t aG D Pw a s7 0 - 8 0 %o ft h eU S
and the number of households was one third of the US. As our model suggests, the
lower mean income together with the smaller market size would lead to a sustainedly
higher TV price-income ratio in the UK than the US.28 In addition, the TV licence
fee in the UK added further cost of adoption. Therefore, TV diﬀu s i o ni nt h eU Kw a s
delayed. The TV price-income ratio is plotted in Figure 13 (a).
How did this delayed diﬀusion aﬀect the timing of shakeout for a durable good
like TV? Recall the early demand of durable goods is mainly the ﬁrst purchase:
Yt ≈ m(Ft − Ft−1) (31)
where m is assumed to be a constant market size. Given the sustainedly higher Pt/μt
ratio, the TV market expansion was postponed in the UK so that the peak of ﬁrst
purchase came in much later. The data of (Ft − Ft−1) is plotted in Figure 13 (b).
Comparing Figure 12 with Figure 13, we notice that the actual TV output declined
less severely in the US than what Equation 31 predicts, which was due to the fast
population growth during that period.29 However, the industry output did level oﬀ
28The absolute price of B&W TV in the UK was not necessarily higher than the US as we have
discussed in section 5.1. Using both oﬃcial exchange rate and PPP, we found the price was actually
lower in the UK.
29During 1948-1963, the household numbers grew at 2% annually in the US and 0.5% in the UK.
36Figure 13: TV Relative Price and Adoption Increment: US vs. UK
in early 1950s, and the relative industry GDP as well as the ﬁrm numbers started
declining at that time. In the case of UK, where the population grew much slower,
the time path of actual output is very close to what we calculate with Equation 31,
which kept increasing until 1959. Consequently, the relative industry GDP as well as
the ﬁrm numbers had not declined until then.
8 Concluding Remarks
Understanding the industry life cycle is an important frontier of economics. One
limitation of the existing literature is its brief treatment of the demand side. Major
theories, like Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994 or Klepper 1996, emphasize the eﬀects
of inter-ﬁrm technological diﬀerences but did little to explain the impacts of demand
characteristics. This paper therefore complements existing knowledge by exploring
a previously largely unexplored demand side. First, it shows that demand changes
37alone could drive a shakeout. Second, it connects characteristics of demand, including
income distribution and market size, to industry life cycle dynamics including timing
of shakeout and observed adoption rates. In addition, this paper provides a new
explanation for logistic demand diﬀusion curves other than the traditional social
contagion theories.
To simplify the analysis, our model assumes a stylized portrayal of ﬁrms. Firms
are assumed to face decreasing return to scale in the short run, achieve optimal pro-
duction scale immediately upon entry, and change optimal production without cost.
Moreover, the span of control α and eﬃciency distribution S(θ) are assumed time-
invariant. Although these assumptions are not unusual and work reasonably well in
the paper, we need be aware that not all of them always hold, and some may work bet-
ter than others in a case-by-case base. In particular, when the comovement between
ﬁrm numbers and relative industry GDP breaks down,30 it signals that additional
explanations may be required outside our theory (e.g. a supply-side explanation).
However, it is possible to extend our theory to consider additional supply-side eﬀects.
As an example, Appendix B modiﬁes the model to allow an increasing α. As a result,
the shakeout starts earlier than the decline of relative industry GDP, but nonetheless
our major ﬁndings on diﬀusion and shakeout remains valid.31
Two ﬁnal comments. First, the competitive market does not internalize spillover
of learning, so the equilibrium derived in the model is not Pareto optimal. A social
planner would prefer a faster diﬀusion and earlier shakeout. Second, the close-country
framework can be generalized. In an open world, a country may specialize in certain
industries to explore the comparative advantage. Then it should be the world income
distribution and world market size that shape the industry life cycle.
30For example, the shakeout may start earlier than the decline in relative GDP (e.g. Auto and
Color TV), or may not occur at all (e.g. Shampoo). I thank Steven Klepper for pointing this out.
31This extension may explain the Auto shakeout in the 1910s. For Color TV, the shakeout was
probably also related to the change of S(θ) considering the entry of Japanese ﬁrms at the time (see
footnote 4).
38Appendix A: Increasing Span of Control
In the paper, we have shown that the relative industry GDP is a good indicator
for the number of ﬁrms. However, it is possible to ﬁnd counterexamples. A dramatic
case is the automobile, for which the ﬁrm shakeout came in around 1910 but the
relative industry GDP kept rising up to the Great Depression. Does that mean our
theory is not consistent with the fact?
Not necessarily. Recall that Proposition 1 is derived on the assumption that the
span of control parameter α is constant over time. In the case of automobile, it is
less likely to be valid. In fact, as the assembly line was introduced in 1910s the auto
industry became more and more capital intensive, so the technology progress may
have also worked through the increasing span of control. If we take that into account,
it is possible for the number of ﬁrms to deviate from the relative industry GDP so
the shakeout comes in earlier. However, this extension does not necessarily invalidate
our previous analysis. In the following, we construct an example with endogenously
increasing span of control to clarify this point.
For simplicity, we assume the industry has identical ﬁrms. The production func-
tion is y = φαAxα where φα =( 1− α)−(1−α)α−α. Assume that there is only labor
input, and the entrepreneur’s forgone earning equals labor’s wage, i.e. C = w,a n d
mean income of the economy is ﬁxed over time. We then have the momentary industry












Assume that there are two channels of learning by doing:
At = A0Q
γ





0 Y (s)ds + Q0.
Characterizing the dynamics of this system, we can show most our analyses stay
unchanged except that the shakeout of ﬁrms now starts earlier than that of GDP.
Lemma 1 The number of ﬁrms starts declining when price elasticity falls to 1+λ/γ.
Proof. Given Pt = C
A0Q
−γ
t and 1 − αt = α0Q
−λ








Hence, the peak of ﬁrm numbers is determined as follows:
∂Nt
∂t








Recall the industry GDP starts declining at ε∗ =1 . Since the demand function
33 has a declining price elasticity, the shakeout of ﬁrm numbers hence starts earlier
at a lower adoption level, 1 −
g(λ+γ)
γ , instead of 1 − g for the industry GDP.
Using Figure 14, we can also check the eﬀects of parameter changes. In particular,
the supply curve shifts down faster if the technology is better (higher Q0, higher A0
or higher γ), the mean income is higher (higher μ) ,t h em a r k e ts i z ei sl a r g e r( h i g h e r
m) or the input price is lower (lower C (w)). As a result, it leads to a faster demand
diﬀusion and earlier industry shakeout.
So far, we have not linked the foregone earning C and input price w to the mean
income μ. What if we do? For the model to be analytically solvable, we no longer
distinguish the entrepreneur’s foregone earning from the input price, i.e. C = w.I ti s
a little diﬀerent from what we assumed in the paper: C = φμ and w = σμψ (ψ<1).
Therefore, we have to discuss two special cases. In one case, C = w = φμ,ah i g h e r
mean income will be fully transferred into a higher production cost so that it does
n o tr e s u l ti nal o w e rr e l a t i v ep r i c eP/μ for a given technology. Hence it does not lead
t oaf a s t e rd i ﬀusion and earlier shakeout. In the other case, if C = w = σμψ (ψ<1),
40Figure 14: Industry Life Cycle with Increasing Span of Control
a higher mean income will only be partly transferred into the production cost so that
t h er e l a t i v ep r i c eP/μ is lower for a given technology. As the result, it does lead to a
faster diﬀusion and earlier shakeout.
Appendix B: Data Details
• US-UK TV Dataset — The US data starts as early as 1946 when the B&W
TV was initially introduced, and ends at 1963 when the sale of color TV took
oﬀ. Most of the data (the number of TV producers, TV output, value of TV
output, household numbers and TV adoption rate) are drawn from periodic
editions of Television Factbook. The nominal GDP per capita is from Johnston
& Williamson (2003) and CPI is from International Historical Statistics: the
Americas, 1750-1993. The UK data also starts from 1946 but ends a little later
41than the US at 1967 when the color TV was introduced. The number of TV pro-
ducers is cited from Simons (2002). The TV output and value are from Monthly
Digest of Statistics (1946-1968). The household numbers are calculated by pop-
ulation (from UN Common Database) divided by average household size (from
UN Demographic Yearbook). The TV adoption rate is from Table AI of Bowden
&O ﬀer (1994), and TV licence fee is from the BBC press oﬃce. The nominal
GDP per capita is from Oﬃcer (2003) and the CPI is from International His-
torical Statistics: Europe, 1750-1993.
• Gort-Klepper Dataset — It covers time-series data of ﬁrm numbers (46 indus-
tries), price (23 industries) and output (25 industries) from the beginning of
each industry up to 1970. 10 industries are selected for our empirical study
considering their long enough coverage and continuos observations.
• US TV Panel Dataset — It covers the TV adoption rate and personal income
across 49 continental states of the US at year 1950, 1955, 1959 and 1963. The
TV adoption rate is drawn from the Television Factbook,a n dt h ep e r s o n a l
income is drawn from the Statistical Abstract of the United States.
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